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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between attitudes on potential uses of
the budget surplus and gender. Survey results show relatively weak support
overall for using a projected surplus to reduce taxes, with respondents much
likelier to prefer increased social spending on education or social security.
There is a signicant gender gap with men being far more likely than women
to support tax cuts or paying down the national debt. Given a menu of
particular types of tax cuts, women are marginally more likely to favor child-
care relief or working poor tax credits whereas men are marginally more
likely to favor capital gains reduction or tax rate cuts. When primed that
the tax laws are biased against two-worker families, men signicantly change
their preferences, moving from support for general tax rate cuts to support
for working poor tax relief, but not to child-care relief. One of the strongest
results to emerge is that women are far more likely than men not to express an
opinion or to confess ignorance about scal matters. Both genders increase
their \no opinion" answer in the face of priming, but men more so than
women. Further research will explore this no opinion/uncertainty aspect.

We thank the University of Southern California Center for Law, Communications, and Public Policy
for a research grant that made our survey research possible. Alvarez thanks the IBM Corporation for
supporting his research through the University Matching Grants Program. This paper was presented at
the 2000 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association.
1 Introduction
Money matters in American politics. In the early days of the American republic, issues such as
whether to develop a national central bank and how to deal with the financing of the Revolution-
ary War were critical and divisive concerns (Aldrich and Grant 1993; Hoadley 1986; Hofstadter
1969). More recently, since the late 1970’s fiscal issues such as tax reform and the budget deficit
have played a major role in American politics, as by fueling the so-called Reagan Revolution. A
new fiscal issue has now appeared on the national scene: the hitherto unthinkable question of how
to spend a budget surplus. The combination of budget cuts and tax increases in the early 1990’s
with unprecedented prosperity in the United States has given fiscal politics a different dynamic.
The most salient publicly discussed candidates for this welcome problem have been tax-cutting,
deficit reduction, protecting the social security system, and increased general social spending.
There has been little research on the differential appeal of various fiscal policies across interest
groups or demographic categories, or on the role such issues have played in determining national
electoral outcomes, at least apart from the watershed 1980 presidential campaign. Lacy (1998)
studied the impact of the Reagan 1980 tax-cutting platform. Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 1998)
examined the role of the budget deficit in the 1992 presidential election and the Bob Dole tax cut
pledge in the 1996 presidential election, respectively. Such research has been more common on
the state and local level, with Citrin (1979), Cournat et al.(1980) and Sears and Citrin (1985) having
all documented the tax revolt that swept through many states following passage of Proposition
13 in California in 1978. Each of these studies has shown that tax-cutting preferences had very
important effects on statewide politics in the 1970s and 1980s.
Given the paucity of more general analysis about fiscal political preferences and their impact
on electoral results, it is not surprising that there is little by way of more particular analysis of
variation in such preferences across demographically distinct subpopulations. Yet fiscal policies
have significantly varying effects on different groups. There are for example generational differ-
ences in opinions about taxation to go along with the obvious generational implications of fiscal
policy (MacManus 1995). There are also gender — or familial structure — biases in tax policy,
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with two-earner households paying sizeable marriage penalties under both the income tax and
social security contribution systems, while one-earner households receive large bonuses under
each (McCaffery 1997, 1999). Might there be a gender gap in fiscal political preferences? If not,
given the shape of the actual law, why not?
Our research agenda (Alvarez and McCaffery 2000) aims to explore these questions. We in-
tend to study the interactions among gender-based differences in fiscal political preferences, the
conduct of political campaigns and media coverage thereof, electoral outcomes, and the substan-
tive evolution of the law. Our working hypothesis is that politicians, responding to a perceived
difference in political priorities as between men and women, target anti-tax messages to men and
pro-spending messages to women. The result is that the substantive law evolves in such a way
that tax cuts are more likely to benefit men or one-earner households, leaving women and two-
earner households to pay a disproportionate share of government spending programs.
Budget politics provide a fertile testing ground for aspects of our broader hypothesis. The par-
ticular analysis of this paper looks at attitudes towards use of the projected budget surplus during
a time – the Fall of 1999 – when the surplus was salient but national electoral politics were not; in
part, we intend to establish a baseline for later analysis of the effect vel non of presidential politics
on fiscal political preferences. Our working hypotheses in this study were that we would find: (1)
a gender gap in fiscal political preferences, with men relatively more preferring tax reduction and
women increased social spending or “investment” programs; (2) given a menu of various possi-
ble tax-cutting proposals, men would favor general tax reduction while women would favor relief
targeted to two-worker families or the working poor; and (3) a “priming” experiment, designed
to make the gender and familial structure biases in tax salient, would exacerbate the predicted
gender gap.
In the remainder of this paper we explore the relationship between gender and the new fiscal
politics in America. First we discuss our theoretical framework and our basic operative hypoth-
esis. Second we turn to a discussion of our our unique survey data collection and then present
simple tests of our primary hypotheses. Third we present multivariate statistical analyses that
also test our hypotheses. We then conclude with a discussion of our results and how they fit into
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a larger research agenda exploring the relationship between gender and fiscal politics in America.
2 Gender, Fiscal Policy, and American Politics
As we argued above, fiscal politics have long had a prominent place in American politics. But it
is only recently that academic researchers have examined the ways in which gender has shaped
the implementation of fiscal policies, with much attention played to welfare and social policy
(Gordon 1994; Mink 1995; Orloff 1991; Skocpol 1995) and taxation (McCaffery 1997, 1999). The
general finding of this growing literature is that fiscal policies in America have been shaped by
gender, with specific policies clearly tailored for men and others tailored for women.
But why are there such clear gender differences in public policy? Here we draw upon three
different strains of previous research: public opinion and political behavior, candidates and their
campaign strategies, and public policy formation. By putting these three literatures together, we
develop our theoretical foundation for our research agenda.
Beginning with public opinion and political behavior, there have been numerous studies doc-
umenting gender differences in opinion and behavior. Probably the clearest and most politically
influential gender difference has been the well-studied “gender gap” in presidential election vot-
ing, in which women have supported Democratic presidential candidates more strongly than men
since the 1980 presidential election (Chaney et al. 1998; Mattei and Mattei 1998). More directly to
the point of our research, however, is the line of studies documenting differences between men
and women in their opinions about social and fiscal policy issues (Gilligan 1982; Kornhauser 1987;
Welch and Hibbing 1992). These studies generally agree that women are more generally in favor
of redistributive social and fiscal policies than men, as women are more “compassionate” than
men (Gilligan 1982) or less driven by immediate “pocketbook” concerns than men (Chaney et al.
1998; Welch and Hibbing 1992).
That gender structures public opinion and voter behavior does not go unnoticed by candi-
dates running for office. In fact, the types of differences which have been observed between men
and women’s opinions about fiscal and social issues are also mirrored in the observed differ-
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ences between men and women when they run for elected office. Some studies have shown that
male candidates focus their campaign rhetoric on “men’s issues” like taxes and the federal budget
while female candidates focus on “women’s issues” like education and health care (Kahn 1993;
Fox 1997); other studies have found that gender differences in candidate strategies and rhetoric
exist, but in oftentimes carefully nuanced forms (Bystrom 1995; Chaney 1998). Relatedly, one
of the common explanations for the gender gap in presidential election voting is that since 1980
the national Democratic party has developed an image as the party better suited to dealing with
“women’s issues”, producing a gender gap in partisanship more than in voting behavior (Cook
and Wilcox 1995).
Thus, men and women have different opinions about issues and policy, and they cast their bal-
lots accordingly. Strategic candidates, aware of these differences, craft their campaign messages
to appeal to men or women based on their electoral needs. Working simultaneously, this can pro-
duce a feedback loop in which gender differences in public opinion and behavior can be sustained
and perhaps even enhanced by the actions of strategic candidates targeting their messages to men
or women (Alvarez and McCaffery 2000). Thus, we have strong reasons to expect that men and
women will have different opinions about social and fiscal issues, which in our research should
be apparent in opinions about the potential uses of the current federal budget surplus.
But there is a third level to our theoretical framework, because these candidates, once elected
to office, work to carry out their campaign promises. This results in the very gender-based public
policy we discussed earlier, where for example some social programs are targeted at single moth-
ers (Gordon 1994; Mink 1995; Orloff 1991; Skocpol 1995) or where tax policy is stacked against
women (McCaffery 1997, 1999). Fortunately, Schneider and Ingram (1997) provide an excellent
theoretical model of how public policy is targeted towards certain demographic groups. This
theoretical model is based on the relative political power of demographic groups and on their
socially constructed public perceptions. So in the Schneider and Ingram framework, groups that
have strong political power and are positively perceived are “advantaged” in policy development
and implementation, while groups that have are weak in power but positively perceived are “de-
pendent”; groups that are negatively perceived but powerful are said to be “contenders”, and
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negatively perceived but weak groups are “deviants.”
What is especially useful about the Schneider and Ingram framework, though, is the emphasis
on the social construction of public perceptions of groups. As Josephson (2000) has noted, this fits
neatly with the idea of “framing” widely used in social science, and that these Schneider and In-
gram frames are widely used in American politics to discuss social and fiscal policy. Policy makers
make a political calculation about populations which are targeted by a public policy, and if policy
makers or politicians wish to cut a program they are “framed” in a “deviant” way. For example,
“in times of austerity, when social programs are being cut, target populations are constructed as
deviant by policymakers through a use of their perceived compliance with appropriate gender-,
race-, and class-based social roles, irrespective of empirical evidence regarding the characteristics
of target populations” (Josephson 2000, 156).
Thus, while there might be gender-based differences in opinions about fiscal policy, the fram-
ing of a fiscal policy proposal can impact policy opinions in the mass public. If presented with
a menu of proposals for the use of the current federal budget surplus, but with a frame shaded
against female-oriented uses of the surplus, we would expect opinions to be shifted away from
these female-oriented uses of the surplus. Conversely, frames which are present female-oriented
uses of the surplus in a positive light should shift opinion towards female-oriented uses of the
budget surplus.
In conclusion, our theoretical framework builds upon three different strands of the existing
literature on gender and politics. We argue that this framework allows us to better understand the
relationship between gender and fiscal politics in the brave new world of a federal budget surplus.
We expect there to be significant gender-based differences in opinions about the potential uses of
the budget surplus, and we also expect that the frames used by politicians and policy makers
will influence opinion about the uses of the budget surplus. In the next section of this paper we
discuss the data we have collected to examine gender and the new fiscal politics in America and
our empirical analysis.
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3 Survey Method and Empirical Tests
We tested our basic hypotheses in several ways using original survey data. We used a professional
market and survey research firm, Interviewing Services of America, Inc., that conducts weekly
national probability samples of American adults.1 In four weekly samples of 1,000 respondents
each, we posed questions about use of the budget surplus and tax cuts.
The surveys were conducted in the Fall of 1999, a time when the budget surplus was salient but
national electoral politics were not.2 This timing was intended to gauge public opinion about the
use of the budget surplus before the possible impacts of the 2000 presidential election campaign.
In our initial survey week, 1,000 respondents were first given the statement, “As you may
know, the federal government is projecting a large budget surplus.” Respondents were then asked
a series of nonexclusive agree/disagree questions: “Do you agree or disagree with the use of the
budget surplus to:”
 reduce taxes
 pay down the national debt
 increase spending on education
 shore up the social security trust fund
Each question also gave respondents the opportunity to state that they did not have an opinion. 3
In all four survey weeks, all respondents were asked a fixed-choice question about particular
types of tax cuts. For one-half of the total pool — 2,000 respondents — this question was preceded
by the statement: “Many experts believe that the tax system, because of its marriage penalties and
limited child-care relief, is biased against working mothers.” (This statement is a fair one sentence
summary of McCaffery (1997, 1999).) The other 2,000 respondents did not receive this “prime.”
All 4,000 respondents were then asked: “Of the following tax cuts, which one do you support the
most?:”
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 capital gains reduction
 across the board tax rate cut
 child-care relief, or
 more tax credits for the working poor
Respondents were again given the opportunity to say that they had no opinion. 4
An appendix presents a detailed breakdown of the demographic and political attributes of the
four samples, which were consistent with typical telephone samples.5 The incidence rate for the
telephone surveys was uniformly about 80%.6 We are confident in the quality of our data and the
validity of our inferences.
4 Results
4.1 General Attitudes
Table 1 presents the distributions of responses to the four agree-disagree questions about the use
of the budget surplus. There is a clear pattern to the rank ordering: the most favored use is
to increase education spending (61.6%), followed by shoring up social security (51.9%), paying
down the national debt (42.7%) and, last, reducing taxes (38.9%). These findings are consistent
with contemporaneous, generally reported polling data showing that Americans, content with
the overall economy, were willing to consider increased social spending and were not clamoring
for tax reductions.7
Table 1 Goes Here
The most surprising feature of the budget surplus question was the high nonresponse rates
for each question. No opinion responses ranged from 24.6%, for education spending, to 43.9% –
the most common answer – for reducing taxes. This suggests that public opinion on the use of a
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budget surplus was not well formed in the Fall of 1999, a fact we later take into account in this
paper and also note for our further research.
Table 2 presents the response distributions for the fixed-choice question, sorted by primed
or unprimed respondent pools. In the unprimed condition, the rank ordering was for a general
tax rate cut (26.1%), working poor tax credit (23.1%), child-care relief (16.6%), and, last, capital
gains reductions (9.4%). This is consistent with other research showing a general preference for
across the board as opposed to targeted tax cuts (Alvarez and McCaffery 2000). As with the agree-
disagree questions, a striking result was the high percentage of non-specific responses. Aggregat-
ing the various non-specific answers, 25% of respondents chose none of the particular answers, a
response rate second only to that for a general rate reduction.
Table 2 Goes Here
The lower panel of Table 2 contains results from the primed respondents. There was a change
in the rank ordering of preferences for particular tax cuts, with working poor tax credits (24.4%)
replacing general tax rate cut (21.1%) as the most preferred, again followed by child-care relief
(15.8%) and capital gains reduction (8.6%). The 2 test statistic for the differences between the
primed and unprimed conditions is 22.3, with 4 degrees of freedom, which is significant at the
p = :00 level. This is interesting, given that the prime drew attention to the problems of “working
mothers,” including in particular noting the “limited child-care relief” of existing law. The decline
in support for general rate reduction and the increase in support for working poor tax credits, but
not child-care relief, suggests that the prime had the effect of making respondents think more of
general redistribution to the poor: that the “problem” of working mothers triggers an economic,
not a familial demographic, response. The most striking effect of the prime, however, was the
increase in the non-specific response rate, which increases to 30.2% (n = 603, aggregated across the
categories). This becomes by far the leading response, suggesting that attitudes towards particular
forms of tax cuts, not well formed in any event, are easily unmoored.
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4.2 Gender Effects
Table 3 sorts the agree-disagree questions by gender. In each case, 2 statistics show that the
differences in the distributions between the genders are statistically significant. Women are much
less likely than men to support the use of the budget surplus for tax reduction or paying down the
national debt, though they are almost equally likely not to disagree with these uses. Women are
more likely to support using the surplus for increased education spending, and far less likely to
disagree with this possible use. On shoring up social security, women are somewhat less likely to
support the use, but also far less likely to disagree with it. On all questions, women are far more
likely to express no opinion; indeed, a majority of women respondents expressed no opinion on
using the surplus to reduce taxes, and this was the most common answer for paying down the
national debt as well. In contrast, men were always more likely to support a given use of the
surplus than to express a “don’t know” opinion.
Table 3 Goes Here
Table 4 presents the fixed-choice question, sorted by priming condition and gender. In a sim-
ple, preliminary look, men appear to be far more influenced by the priming experiment than
women. The priming experiment decreases by almost 7% (in absolute terms) the proportion of
men supporting a general tax rate reduction, (29% in the unprimed condition to 22% in the primed
condition). Men in the primed experiment also marginally provide more support for working
poor tax credits (increasing by about 4%). Most notably, the non-response or no opinion category
increases for men by roughly 7% in the primed condition. Men seem to respond to the priming
experiment by being more supportive of working poor tax credits, as well as becoming more un-
certain or ambivalent about the use of the budget surplus in general. The differences we observe
for men between the primed and unprimed conditions are statistically significant (2=19.9, four
degrees of freedom, p = :00).
Table 4 Goes Here
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Women, on the other hand, differ only very slightly between the unprimed and primed condi-
tions. The only real difference between the two experiments is that there is an almost 5% increase
in the percentage of women who have no opinion or give no response in the primed condition.
Statistically speaking, the differences between women in the primed and unprimed conditions are
weak, with the 2 test for differences in the two response distributions significant at the p = :17
level (2=6.4, with four degrees of freedom).
Our findings fit interestingly with long-standing research suggesting that men are more nar-
rowly self-interested, or concerned with “pocketbook” issues, while women are more altruistic or
sociotropic in their political preferences (Chaney et al. 1998; Welch and Hibbing 1992). Our survey
results confirm this prior finding both in the initial agree/disagree question (Table 3) and in the
unprimed condition of the fixed choice question (Table 4). In virtually all cases (with shoring up
social security posing a slight exception), men are far more likely to prefer choices that minimize
“private bads,” or general taxes, and women more likely to choose increasing “public goods,”
spending programs or targeted tax relief. The effect of the prime, however, complicates this anal-
ysis. The significant change in men’s opinions post prime suggests both that men can respond
to priming by becoming more altruistic or sociotropic, and that they view the particular prob-
lem of two-worker families as an economic class-based, not a family-based, one (hence the shift
towards working poor, not child-care, tax relief). Women’s failure to change significantly as a
result of the prime suggests that they might have already incorporated sociotropic leanings into
their unprimed preferences. This is consistent with prior analysis suggesting that a gender gap
in observed fiscal political preferences is highly context dependent, turning on the trade-offs im-
plied by a question (Alvarez and McCaffery 2000), and on more general research suggesting that
framing effects loom large in normative evaluations of tax systems (McCaffery and Baron 2000).
4.3 Multivariate Analysis
The limitation of our simple analyses in the previous section is that they cannot tell us much about
whether the differences between men and women are due to gender and not other factors. This
section presents the results of multivariate statistical models that allow us to look precisely at the
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role of gender, controlling for other demographic factors and political beliefs.
We have a wide variety of demographic measures on each respondent: gender, age, whether
they have children, educational attainment, income, marital status, racial identification and parti-
san affiliation. These various measures gave us a wide set of statistical controls to develop a more
precise understanding of the relationship between gender and fiscal political preferences.
Many of the explanatory variables were coded as simple binary variables: gender, whether the
respondent has children, whether the respondent is single or divorced, whether they are African-
American, and whether they are Democratic or Republican. Our measures for age, educational at-
tainment, and income were ordinal, with age measured with eleven categories (18-20, 21-24, 25-29,
30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, and over 65), educational attainment measured with
seven categories (some grade school, completed grade school, some high school, completed high
school, some college, and some graduate school or more), and income categorized as well with
seven levels (under $20,000, $20,000 through $29,999, $30,000 through $39,999, $40,000 through
$49,999, $50,000 through $74,999, $75,000 through $99,999, and over $100,000).
We used two types of multivariate models. For the first use of budget surplus questions, which
had three discrete choices (agree/disagree/don’t know), we employed four different multinomial
logit models to examine the effect of each explanatory variable on the relative odds of a respondent
agreeing, disagreeing, or not having an opinion.
For the fixed-choice, particular form of tax cut question, lumping together the non-specific
responses gave us a five-category discrete variable. We again used multinomial logit to deter-
mine the impact of each explanatory variable on the relative odds of picking one of these choices.8
The actual multinomial logit results are themselves not simple to understand, as they employ
nonlinear statistical models. That is, the coefficient estimates of a multinomial logit analysis are
expressions of the estimated impact of a particular independent variable on the probability of
some choice being made, depending on the values of all of the other independent variables. This
dependence of one variable’s estimate on the values of other variables makes easy understanding
of multinomial logit results complicated. Rather than discussing the actual multinomial logit re-
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sults, we instead concentrate our presentation on the estimated probability effects derived from
the multinomial logit models.9
We begin with the four agree/disagree questions. The estimated effects for “reduce taxes” and
“pay down the national debt” questions are in the top two panes of Table 5; those for “increased
education spending” and “shore up social security” questions are in the bottom two panels of
Table 5. In each panel of the table, we provide estimated effects for each of the independent
variables on the probability that a hypothetical average respondent would agree, disagree, or
express no opinion for each policy question. The estimates which are starred represent ones which
are statistically different from zero at the p = :05 level of statistical significance10
Table 5 Goes Here
Table 5 shows that women, controlling for all other variables, are about .09 less likely than
men to favor either tax or deficit reduction, but are much more likely than men to express no
opinion (.14 and .12, respectively). There are also relatively strong effects for education. Increasing
educational attainment leads to a much greater probability of disagreeing with tax reduction but
agreeing with paying down the national debt. Partisanship also matters. Self-identified Democrats
disagree about reducing taxes but agree with paying down the national debt. Republicans, in
contrast, favor reducing taxes, but side with Democrats in agreeing to reduce the national debt.
Self-identifying as being either a Democrat or a Republican makes one significantly more likely to
have an opinion about any of the uses.
The lower panels of Table 5 provides analogous results for education spending and shoring
up the social security system. Again gender is significant. Women agree with increased edu-
cation spending, but seem uncertain or ambivalent about shoring up social security, relative to
men. Once again being a woman predicts a greater likelihood of no specific opinion. Age, not a
major factor in the tax or debt reduction options, is not surprisingly a strong factor here. Increas-
ing respondent age leads to much less support for education but much more for social security.
Increasing educational attainment leads to greatly increased likelihoods of supporting both educa-
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tion and social security protection. Partisanship again matters. Democrats (for) and Republicans
(against) disagree over educational spending but roughly agree over shoring up social security.
Partisanship also, again not surprisingly, makes it far more likely that a given respondent has an
opinion.
Table 6 gives the multinomial logit analysis of the fixed-choice tax cut question, where we
employed the priming condition. This model used all of the independent variables in the previous
ones, but we added two new variables. One is a binary variable for whether the respondent was
“primed” or not. The second is an interaction variable between the respondent’s gender and
whether she was primed. The survey question had four specific response options (capital gains,
tax rate reduction, child-care relief, and tax credits for the working poor), and we lumped together
all non-specific responses.
Table 6 Goes Here
The first three rows of Table 6 contain results that test our primary hypotheses. Controlling
for all other variables, gender matters. Women were somewhat less likely than men to choose
reducing capital gains or general tax rate relief as their primary choice for the use of the budget
surplus. Women were slightly more likely to focus on child-care relief than men, but slightly less
likely to pick working poor credits. Once again, women are far more likely than men to have no
opinion about the use of the budget surplus.
Next, respondents who were primed were less likely to state that capital gains or tax rate
relief were their priorities. Those in the priming condition were more likely to state that working
poor credits were their priority, but these same respondents were slightly less likely to state that
child-care relief was their priority. The prime also produced a higher no opinion rate than in the
non-experimental condition.
Last, the interaction between gender and the prime did not have a strong impact on responses.
The only statistically reliable result is that primed women were less likely to choose working poor
tax credits relative to men; recall that men reacted to the prime rather dramatically by shifting
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from general rate reduction to working poor relief. None of the other interactions between gender
and our priming condition were statistically nor substantively significant.
Other results in Table 6 merit discussion. Age, education, income, race and partisanship all
had important effects. Older respondents are much less likely to choose child-care relief. Increased
educational attainment led to an increased probability for supporting general tax rate cuts. Higher
family income led to a higher probability of support for capital gains reductions and general tax
rate cuts, but lower odds of support for child-care or working poor tax credits. Blacks took just the
opposite tack — relatively more supporting child-care and working poor tax relief, and opposing
general rate or capital gains tax reductions. Democrats were much more likely to favor working
poor tax credits while Republicans were much more likely to favor tax rate relief and capital gains
tax cuts.
5 Conclusions
There is indeed a gender gap in fiscal political preferences, though it is not always easy to discern.
This most general finding of our research is consistent with previous work that has assumed or
argued that women and men have different political and economic focuses and concerns (Gilligan
1982; Welch and Hibbing 1992). Also, our results are consistent with our theoretical framework
which predicted that these gender gaps in fiscal political preferences should exist.
In the Fall of 1999, without a pressing national political campaign and with the new issue of
possible uses for a budget surplus to consider, we found an overall low level of salience on fiscal
political issues. In this context and consistent with the trend of prior research, we found that men
were more likely to support narrowly pocketbook issues, being more likely than women to prefer
minimizing “private bads.” Women, in contrast, were more altruistic or sociotropic, more likely
to support increased spending on public goods (Welch and Hibbing 1992).
This simple story is too simple. Recent studies of the gender gap in presidential elections have
underscored the complicated relationship between gender and political behavior, as by showing
for example that no one single explanation exists for understanding the gender gap in presidential
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elections since 1980 (Chaney et al. 1998). Our work shows again that the gender gap is fiscal and
tax policy issues is not a simple phenomenon — it is complicated and context dependent.
One striking aspect of our survey, for example, was the high level of professed ignorance
and/or indifference and, even more striking, the high gender gap in this uncertainty category.
Women are far more likely not to have an opinion about fiscal political issues. This is consistent
with at least one recent study that uncovered systematic, persistent gender differences in political
information and knowledge, with women tending to know less about politics than men, even
controlling for many of the variables usually associated with political awareness (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 2000). Whether ignorance or indifference in the domain of fiscal and tax issues is
due to fundamental uncertainty by women about these specific policy issues (e.g. Alvarez 1998)
or whether this arises because of ambivalence (e.g. Alvarez and Brehm 1995) warrants further
analysis.
A second striking result of our survey was that men but not women responded to an issues
“prime” that drew attention to the biases of the tax system against working mothers. In the face
of this prime, men became both more uncertain and more sociotropic, although their particular
response indicated an economic concern with redistribution rather than a categorical concern with
working mothers. The varying effect of the prime suggested that women had already incorporated
their sociotropic leanings into their preferences, whereas men have to — but can be — prodded
into this.
The combination of high levels of uncertainty and ignorance with evidence that preferences
can be changed by priming devices — and the fact that each of these elements differs between
the genders — suggests that trends in fiscal political preferences over time bear close watching.
As electoral campaigns approach, do fiscal political matters become more salient, and are the ef-
fects parallel between the genders? Do candidates or political parties tailor certain messages for
men and others for women, to “prime” them differently? How and when if at all is this strat-
egy successful? There has been little empirical research about the links among informational and
opinion-oriented gender gaps and the conduct of political campaigns. Thus, given the high level
of public uncertainty and ignorance, the stakes involved, and the potential for divergent opin-
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ions between the genders, fiscal political issues are an interesting testing ground for studying the
interactions among gender, politics, and law.
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Endnotes
1Interviewing Services of America, Inc., regularly conducts marketing and political surveys; this company has con-
ducted political surveys recently for the Los Angeles Times and for previous research reported by Alvarez and Nagler
(2000).
2Specifically, the weekly samples were obtained in October 18-22, 1999 (Sample 1), November 1-5, 1999 (Sample 2),
November 29-December 3, 1999 (Sample 3), and December 6-10, 1999 (Sample 4). At this time, numerous newspaper
accounts were relating the political success of President Clinton’s refusal to use the surplus to reduce taxes. See Gallup
Poll Releases July 21, 1999, “Americans Favor Increased Medicare Spending Over Tax Cuts”; John M. Broder, “Clinton
Eager to Veto Tax Cut,” NY Times Abstracts, September 2, 1999 at 22; Eric Pianin and Juliet Eilperin, “Clinton Will
Submit Social Security Plan; He Assails GOP as Final Budget Showdown Looms,” Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1999 at
A1.
3For example, the reduce taxes question read in full: “Do you agree or disagree with the use of the budget surplus
to reduce taxes, or don’t you have an opinion?”
4Specifically, half of our 4000 respondents received the “primed” question: ”Many experts believe that the tax sys-
tem, because of its marriage penalties and limited child-care relief, is biased against working mothers. Of the following
tax cuts, which one do you support the most, capital gains reduction, across the board tax rate cut, child-care relief,
more tax credits for the working poor, or don’t you have an opinion?” The other half of our total sample received the
“unprimed” question, which was worded: ”Of the following tax cuts, which one do you support the most, capital gains
reduction, across the board tax rate cut, child-care relief, more tax credits for the working poor, or don’t you have an
opinion?”
5In comparison with the most recent National Election Studies sample (1998), our samples are somewhat more male
(our samples are almost exactly 50% male and 50% female, while the NES is 46% men and 54% women) and somewhat
less white (the NES is 86% white, 12% African American, and only 2% other non-whites; our samples have between 77
and 80% white respondents, 9 to 11% African-American, 5 to 8% Latino, 2% Asian, and 4 to 5% other ethnic or racial
background). Our samples have roughly the same educational attainment and income distributions. All of our sample
distributions are in the appendix of this paper.
6Interviewing Services of American, Inc., computes the survey incidence rates as follows. They take the total number
of completed interviews (1000) and add to that the number of suspended and broken-off interviews; they divide this
by the number of total screening contacts to produce the incidence rate.
7For example, the Los Angeles Times conducted a telephone poll in November 13-18, 1999 of 1800 adults nationally,
and asked the following question: “As you may know, the Congressional Budget Office says there will be about a
one trillion dollar budget surplus over the next ten years. This surplus is in addition to the funds collected for Social
Security. Some say we should use the surplus for a small tax cut and use most of the money to strengthen social security
and Medicare and increase spending on areas such as education; others want to use most of the surplus for a tax cut.
Which of these options comes closer to your view?” 80% of the respondents were in favor of using the budget surplus
for “most programs”, 14% for a “tax cut”, and 6% did not have an opinion.
8As there was a fairly high rate of survey item non-response on income, with roughly 30% of the respondents not
providing any information about their income, we used multiple imputation to produce a series of five complete data
matrices for our multivariate analysis (Honaker et al. 1999). Simply put, multiple imputation uses information from
responses an individual did provide to produce many estimates for the missing responses. Multiple estimates for
missing responses are critical as that is the only way in which to incorporate estimation uncertainty easily into the
multiple imputation procedure. We then estimates the analysis model (in our case the multinomial logit models) for
each of the imputed datasets; then we simply average the results across the datasets and report those averages in this
paper. We used the Amelia package in GAUSS for our multiple imputation analysis (Honaker et al. 1999). Additional
details and results are available from the authors upon request. We then estimate our multinomial logit models one
each of the five complete data matrices, and we report the averaged results across the five estimations.
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9We present the actual averaged model estimates in an appendix, in Tables 9 and 10. Interested readers can refer to
those tables to examine the actual multinomial logit results.
10We produce these probability estimates using the Clarify software package (Tomz et al. 2000).
18
Bibliography
Aldrich, John H. and Ruth W. Grant. 1993. “The Antidederalists, the first Congress and the first
national parties.” Journal of Politics 55: 295-326.
Alvarez, R. Michael. 1998. Information and Elections. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 1995. “American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy:
A Heteroskedastic Probit Method for Assessing Conflicting Values.” American Journal of Political
Science 39: 1055-82.
Alvarez, R. Michael Alvarez and Edward J. McCaffery. 2000. “Gender and Tax” in Sue Tolleson-
Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson, editors, Gender and American Politics: Women, Men and the Political
Process (New York: M.E. Sharpe).
Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler, 2000. “The Expressive American Voter.” California
Institute of Technology, Manuscript.
Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler, 1998. “When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating
Models of Multicandidate Elections.”American Journal of Political Science 42,1: 55-96.
Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler, 1995. “Voter Choice in 1992: Economics, Issues and
Anger.” American Journal of Political Science 39,3: 714-744.
Bystrom, Dianne. 1995. Candidate Gender and the Presentation of Self: The Videostyles of Men and
Women in U.S. Senate Campaigns. Norman: University of Oklahoma, Ph.D. Dissertation.
Chaney, Carol Kennedy. 1998. Vote Choice in Senate Elections: The Impact of Campaigns and Candidate
Gender, 1988-1992. Riverside: University of California, Riverside, Ph. D. Dissertation.
Chaney, Carol Kennedy, R. Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler. 1998. “Explaining the Gender
Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992.” Political Research Quarterly 51(2): 311-40.
Citrin, Jack. 1979. ”Do People Want Something for Nothing? Public Opinion on Taxes and Spend-
19
ing.” National Tax Journal 32, 113-129.
Cook, Elizabeth Adell and Clyde Wilcox. 1995. “Women Voters in the ‘Year of the Women’.” In
Herbert E. Weisberg, ed., Democracy’s Feast: Elections in America, pp 195-219. Chatham: Chatham
House.
Cournat, P.N., E.M. Gramlich, and D. L. Rubinfeld. 1980. ”Why Voters Support Tax Limitation
Amendments: The Michigan Case.” National Tax Journal 33, 1-20.
Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 2000. “Gender and Political Knowledge.” In Sue
Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson, editors, Gender and American Politics: Women, Men and the
Political Process (New York: M.E. Sharpe).
Fox, Richard Logan. 1997. Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gordon, Linda. 1994. Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare. New York:
The Free Press.
Hoadley, John F. 1986. Origins of American Political Parties, 1789-1803. Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press.
Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United
States, 1780-1840. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Honaker, James, Anna Joseph, Gary King, Kim Shreve and Nannibal Singh. 1999. “Amelia: A
Program for Missing Data.” http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/amelia.zip
Josephson, Jyl J. 2000. “Gender and Social Policy” in Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson,
editors, Gender and American Politics: Women, Men and the Political Process (New York: M.E. Sharpe).
Kahn, Kim Fridkin. 1996. The Political Consequences of Being a Woman: How Stereotypes Influence the
20
Conduct and Consequences of Political Campaigns. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kornhauser, Marjorie E. 1987. “The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction.” Michigan Law Review 86: 465-523.
Lacy, Dean. 1998. “Electoral Support for Tax Cuts: A Case Study of the 1980 American Presiden-
tial Election.” American Politics Quarterly 26,3: 288-307.
MacManus, Susan A. 1995. “Taxing and Spending Policies: A Generational Perspective.” Journal
of Politics 57, 3:607-629.
Mattei, Laura Winsky and Franco Mattai. 1998. “If Men Stayed Home ... The Gender Gap in
Recent Congressional Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 51: 411-436.
McCaffery, Edward J. 1997 and 1999(paper). Taxing Women. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.)
McCaffery, Edward J. and Jon Baron. 2000. “How Perspective and Framing Affect the Evaluation
of Tax Policies.” work in progress.
Mink, Gwendolyn. 1995. The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Orloff, Ann Shola. 1991. “Gender in Early U.S. Social Policy.” Journal of Policy History 3: 249-281.
Schneider, Anne and Helen Ingram. 1997. Policy Design for Democracy. Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas.
Skocpol, Theda. 1995. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the
United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sears, David O. and Jack Cirin. 1985. Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press).
Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King. 2000. “Clarify: Software for Interpreting and
21
Presenting Statistical Results.” http://gking.harvard.edu/files/clarify.zip
Turnier, William J., Pamela Johnston Conover and David Lowery. 1996. “Redistributive Justice
and Cultural Feminism.” American University Law Review 45: 1275-1322.
Welch, Susan, and John Hibbing. 1992. “Financial Conditions, Gender and Voting in American
National Elections.” Journal of Politics 54(1):197-213.
22
Table 1: Uses of Budget Surplus
Agree Disagree Don’t Know
To Reduce Taxes
Percent 38.9 17.2 43.9
Number 389 172 439
To Pay Down National Debt
Percent 42.7 15.6 41.7
Number 427 156 417
To Increase Education Spending
Percent 61.6 13.8 24.6
Number 616 138 246
To Shore Up Social Security
Percent 51.9 14 34.1
Number 519 140 341
Table 2: Support for Tax Cuts
Percent Number
Unprimed
Capital Gains Reduction 9.4 188
Tax Rate Cut 26.1 521
Child Care Relief 16.6 331
Working Poor Tax Credits 23.1 461
Don’t Care, No Opinion 25.0 499
Primed
Capital Gains Reduction 8.6 172
Tax Rate Cut 21.1 421
Child Care Relief 15.8 316
Working Poor Tax Credits 24.4 488
Don’t Care, No Opinion 30.2 603
Note: Don’t Care, No Opinion category contains an aggregation of non-
response options: No Preference, No Opinion, Don’t Care, or Don’t Know.
The differences between primed and unprimed conditions are statistically
significant, 2=22.3, 4 degrees of freedom, p = :00.
Table 3: Gender and Uses of Budget Surplus
Men Women
Agree Disagree Don’t Know Agree Disagree Don’t Know
To Reduce Taxes
Percent 44.4 19.0 36.6 33.4 15.4 51.2
Number 222 95 183 167 77 256

2 21.8*
To Pay Down National Debt
Percent 49.0 15.2 35.8 36.4 16.0 47.6
Number 245 76 179 182 80 238

2 17.7*
To Increase Education Spending
Percent 59.8 17.8 22.4 63.4 9.8 26.8
Number 299 89 112 317 49 134

2 14.1*
To Shore Up Social Security
Percent 54.0 16.2 29.8 49.8 11.8 38.4
Number 270 81 149 294 59 192

2 9.7*
Table 4: Support for Tax Cuts by Gender
Men Women
Percent Number Percent Number
Primed
Capital Gains Reduction 10.1 101 7.1 71
Tax Rate Cut 22.8 228 19.3 193
Child Care Relief 14.0 140 17.6 176
Working Poor Tax Credits 25.4 254 23.4 234
No Opinion 27.7 277 32.6 326
Unprimed
Capital Gains Reduction 11.9 119 6.9 69
Tax Rate Cut 29.3 294 22.8 227
Child Care Relief 15.3 153 17.9 178
Working Poor Tax Credits 21.7 218 24.4 243
No Opinion 21.8 219 28.1 280
Note: The differences between the response distributions for men and women in the
primed condition, and comparing men and women in the unprimed condition, are both
statistically significant (the 2 for the men-women comparison in the primed condition is
17.1, 4 degrees of freedom, p = :00; the 2 for the men-women comparison in the unprimed
condition is 32.6, 4 degrees of freedom, p = :00.) The other comparison of distributions,
where men are compared between primed and unprimed conditions, and where women
are compared between primed and unprimed conditions, are statistically significant for
men (2=19.9, 4 degrees of freedom, p = :00) but is only significant at the p = :17 level for
women (2=6.4, four degrees of freedom.)
Table 5: Estimated Effects on Independent Uses of Budget Surplus
Reduce Taxes National Debt
Probability of: Probability of:
Variable Agree Disagree Don’t Know Agree Disagree Don’t Know
Women -0.09* -0.06* 0.14* -0.09* -0.02 0.12*
Age 0.01 0.05 -0.08* 0.06 -0.03 -0.04
Children 0.07* -0.01 -0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.08*
Education -0.11* 0.17* -0.09* 0.22* 0.03 -0.24*
Income 0.06 0.08* -0.12* 0.02 0.03 -0.05*
Single -0.06* -0.00 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Formerly married -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.00 -0.04*
Black 0.08* -0.07* -0.02 -0.10* 0.05 0.05*
Democrats -0.00 0.13* -0.12* 0.10* 0.05 -0.14*
Republicans 0.16* 0.06* -0.20* 0.07* 0.09* -0.16*
Education Social Security
Probability of: Probability of:
Variables Agree Disagree Don’t Know Agree Disagree Don’t Know
Women 0.05* -0.06* 0.03* -0.05* -0.06* 0.09*
Age -0.18* 0.06 0.09* 0.15* 0.05 -0.10
Children 0.08* 0.03 -0.09* 0.01 0.07* -0.08*
Education 0.14* 0.05 -0.20* 0.15* 0.06 -0.20*
Income -0.12* 0.02 0.07* 0.02 0.04 -0.04*
Single 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02
Formerly married 0.07* 0.00 -0.07* 0.00 0.08* -0.08*
Black -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.07*
Democrats 0.15* 0.00 -0.15* 0.16* 0.02 -0.17*
Republicans -0.02 0.09* -0.09* 0.09* 0.05 -0.13*
Note: Table entries are estimated probability effects. The starred entries are estimates
which are statistically distinct from zero at the p = :05 level.
Table 6: Estimated Effects on Uses of Budget Surplus
Effects on Probability of Choosing:
Variable Capital Gains Tax Rate Relief Child Care Working Poor Credits No Opinion
Women -0.04* -0.06* 0.02* -0.01 0.08*
Primed -0.02* -0.07* -0.02* 0.04* 0.06*
Interaction 0.02 0.02 0.02* -0.04* -0.02*
Age 0.02* 0.05* -0.21* 0.05* 0.10*
Children -0.03* 0.01 0.04* 0.03* -0.06*
Education 0.04* 0.12* 0.04* 0.01 -0.21*
Income 0.09* 0.15* -0.09* -0.16* 0.00
Single 0.01 -0.06* -0.02* -0.02* 0.09*
Formerly married -0.01 -0.02* 0.02* -0.01 0.02*
Black -0.04* -0.08* 0.04* 0.05* 0.03*
Democrats 0.02* -0.00 0.05* 0.13* -0.20*
Republicans 0.07* 0.15* -0.02* -0.04* -0.17*
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Table 7: Survey Sample Details
Attribute Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
Gender
Men 50% 50.1% 50.2% 50.0%
Women 50% 49.9% 49.8% 50.0%
Education
Some Grade School 2.0% 1.8% 2.1% 2.1%
Complete Grade School 3.3% 2.6% 2.2% 1.5%
Some High School 8.5% 8.7% 8.6% 8.1%
Compete High School 29.7% 28.8% 32.1% 31.4%
Some College 24.0% 27.2% 24.4% 26.4%
Compete College 21.3% 22.3% 23.1% 22.4%
Some Grad School 11.3% 8.5% 7.7% 8.2%
Income
Under $20K 16.4% 20.0% 14.8% 18.4%
$20K-$30K 17.8% 16.8% 20.3% 14.5%
$30K-$40K 17.9% 14.4% 16.9% 14.5%
$40K-$50K 11.3% 13.5% 13.1% 13.7%
$50K-$75K 19.1% 18.7% 17.6% 23.2%
$75K-$100K 10.4% 8.2% 9.1% 6.0%
Over $100K 7.1% 8.5% 8.2% 9.8%
Race
White 76.7% 76.6% 79.6% 77.6%
African American 8.9% 10.9% 9.3% 10.6%
Latino 8.1% 5.1% 5.2% 4.8%
Asian 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% 1.8%
Other 3.9% 5.2% 3.6% 5.2%
Partisanship
Democratic 29.4% 28.5% 26.0% 26.0%
Republican 22.7% 25.3% 23.8% 23.5%
Independent 23.3% 24.3% 24.6% 20.6%
Other 24.6% 21.9% 25.6% 29.9%
Incidence Rate
83.0% 83.0% 83.6% 84.0%
Table 8: Breakdowns of Priming Experiment
Percent Number
Survey 1—Primed
Capital Gains Reduction 7.9 79
Tax Rate Cut 19.3 193
Child Care Relief 16.7 167
Working Poor Tax Credits 28.7 287
No Preference 3.4 34
No Opinion 7.4 74
Don’t Care .9 9
Don’t Know 15.7 157
Survey 2–Unprimed
Capital Gains Reduction 9.4 94
Tax Rate Cut 26.4 264
Child Care Relief 16.7 167
Working Poor Tax Credits 26.8 268
No Preference 4.1 41
No Opinion 3.7 37
Don’t Care 1.7 17
Don’t Know 11.2 112
Survey 3–Unprimed
Capital Gains Reduction 9.4 94
Tax Rate Cut 25.7 257
Child Care Relief 16.4 164
Working Poor Tax Credits 19.3 193
No Preference 3.7 37
No Opinion 10.2 102
Don’t Care 4.0 40
Don’t Know 11.3 113
Survey 4–Primed
Capital Gains Reduction 9.3 93
Tax Rate Cut 22.8 228
Child Care Relief 14.9 149
Working Poor Tax Credits 20.1 201
No Preference 3.9 39
No Opinion 11.0 110
Don’t Care 2.6 26
Don’t Know 15.4 154
Table 9: Multinomial Logit Results on Uses of Budget Surplus
Variables Reduce Taxes National Debt Education Social Security
Probability of Disagree to Agree
Constant -2.64* .32 -1.99** -1.10**
.58 .53 .57 .55
Women .07 .45** -.71** -.22
.20 .20 .21 .20
Age .009 -.07* .16** -.02
.05 .05 .05 .05
Children -.65** -.10 -.15 .43**
.23 .22 .25 .23
Education .32** -.20** -.06 -.06
.08 .08 .08 .08
Income .05 -.01 .11* .06
.07 .06 .07 .07
Single .20 -.14 -.18 .21
.28 .27 .29 .28
Formerly Married .18 -.29 -.38* .52**
.27 .28 .28 .26
Black -.83** .82** -.53 -.34
.40 .32 .49 .41
Democrat .69** -.28 -.89** -.80**
.22 .23 .28 .25
Republican -.49* .03 .65** -.12
.26 .24 .23 .23
Probability of Don’t Know to Agree
Constant 1.08* 1.83* .06 1.67**
.42 .44 .48 .43
Women .78** .72* .22* .54**
.15 .15 .16 .15
Age -.05* -.04 .08** -.10**
.03 .04 .04 .03
Children -.46** -.16 -.71** -.47**
.18 .18 .19 .18
Education -.04 -.26** -.22** -.20**
.06 .06 .07 .06
Income -.10** -.06 .08 -.04
.05 .05 .08 .06
Single .26 .02 .06 -.12
.21 .2 .24 .21
Formerly Married -.13 -.26* -.57** -.47**
.21 .21 .23 .22
Black -.17 .45* .24 .40*
.26 .28 .29 .26
Democrat -.59** -.87** -1.24** -1.15**
.18 .17 .20 .18
Republican -1.24** -.99** -.77** -.86**
.19 .19 .22 .20
Table 10: Multinomial Logit Model of Budget Surplus Uses
Probability of Ranking Relative to Capital Gains Reduction
Variables Tax Rate Cut Child Care Relief Working Poor Credits No Opinion
Constant 1.18** 2.21** 2.00** 2.48**
.37 .39 .39 .38
Women .24* .65** .54** .81**
.18 .19 .18 .18
Primed -.08 .09 .35** .42**
.16 .18 .17 .17
Interaction -.12 -.08 -.39* -.27
.25 .28 .26 .26
Age .006 -.16** .003 .02
.03 .03 .03 .03
Children .35** .55** .45** .08
.15 .16 .15 .15
Education .01 -.04 -.07* -.20**
.05 .06 .05 .06
Income -.06* -.26** -.28** -.16**
.04 .05 .05 .06
Single -.37** -.19 -.19 .23*
.17 .18 .18 .18
Formerly Married -.03 .18 .04 .14
.20 .22 .20 .21
Black .18 .82** .81** .71**
.29 .28 .27 .28
Democrat -.22* .10 .28* -1.09**
.16 .17 .16 .17
Republican -.15 -.85** -.88** -1.50**
.14 .17 .16 .15
